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Guiding	  Section	  5:	  Comments	  on	  the	  Commissioners	  
Steven	  C.	  Salop1	  	  
Abstract	  
This	   short	   note	   comments	   on	   the	   role	   of	   Section	   5	   distinct	   from	   the	   Sherman	   Act.	   	   It	   suggests	   that	  
Section	   5	   be	   used	   to	   attack	   and	   deter	   certain	   conduct	   that	   falls	   into	   gaps	   of	   the	   Sherman	   Act.	   This	  
includes	   exclusionary	   unilateral	   conduct	   that	   likely	   leads	   to	   the	   achievement,	   enhancement,	   or	  
maintenance	  of	  market	  power	  (as	  opposed	  to	  monopoly	  power).	  	  It	  also	  includes	  unilateral	  conduct	  such	  
as	   invitations	   to	   collude	   and	   other	   practices	   that	   facilitate	   conscious	   parallelism,	   tacit	   or	   express	  
collusion,	  but	  are	  not	  uniquely	  or	  sufficiently	  “unequivocal”	  or	  “consequential”	  to	  violate	  Section	  2.	  	  The	  
comment	   also	   explains	   why	   a	   limitation	   of	   Section	   5	   only	   to	   conduct	   with	   zero	   cognizable	   efficiency	  
benefits	  would	  neutralize	  Section	  5	  and	  lead	  to	  under-­‐deterrence	  problems	  and	  why	  a	  disproportionate	  
harm	  standard	  also	  is	  problematical.	  
	  
I.	  INTRODUCTION	  
FTC	  Commissioners	  Joshua	  Wright	  and	  Maureen	  Ohlhausen	  have	  proposed	  that	  the	  Commission	  
adopt	   Guidelines	   for	   the	   application	   of	   Section	   5	   to	   Unfair	  Methods	   of	   Competition	   (“UMC”).2	  These	  
UMC	   Guidelines	   would	   apply	   to	   non-­‐merger	   conduct	   that	   may	   not	   violate	   the	   Sherman	   Act.	   Agency	  
Guidelines	   can	   provide	   a	   useful	   role	   in	   defining	   the	   scope	   of	   agency	   enforcement	   intentions	   and	  
providing	  guidance	  to	  the	  business	  community,	  outside	  counsel,	  and	  agency	  staff.3	  They	  also	  can	  lead	  to	  
more	   refined	   legal	   standards.	  This	   short	  note	  will	   comment	  on	   the	   role	  of	  Section	  5	  distinct	   from	  the	  
Sherman	  Act	  and	  how	  this	  relates	  to	  the	  Commissioners’	  proposed	  Guidelines.	  
II.	  SECTION	  5	  AND	  SHERMAN	  ACT	  DISTINCTIONS	  
A	  legal	  standard	  for	  Section	  5	  that	  is	  distinct	  from	  Sherman	  Act	  standards	  can	  play	  an	  important	  
role	  in	  the	  overall	  system	  of	  antitrust	  enforcement.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  gaps	  in	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  that	  
permit	  harmful	  anticompetitive	  conduct	  and	  reduce	  deterrence.	  Consistent	  with	  the	  legislative	  mandate	  
                                                      
1	  Professor	  of	  Economics	  and	  Law,	  Georgetown	  University	  Law	  Center;	  Senior	  Consultant,	  Charles	  River	  
Associates.	  This	  note	  is	  based	  on	  my	  presentation	  at	  the	  ABA	  Post-­‐Annual	  Meeting	  (August	  15,	  2013).	  I	  have	  
benefited	  from	  our	  panel	  discussion	  and	  helpful	  comments	  from	  Jonathan	  Baker,	  Julie	  Brill,	  Jonathan	  Jacobson,	  
and	  Joshua	  Wright.	  All	  opinions	  and	  errors	  remain	  my	  own.	  	  A	  version	  of	  this	  paper	  was	  prepared	  for	  the	  CPI	  
Symposium	  on	  Section	  5.	  
2	  Statement	  of	  Commissioner	  Joshua	  D.	  Wright,	  Proposed	  Policy	  Statement	  Regarding	  Unfair	  Methods	  of	  
Competition	  Under	  Section	  5	  of	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  Act	  (June	  19,	  2013)	  (hereinafter,	  Wright	  Statement),	  
available	  at	  http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/wright/130619umcpolicystatement.pdf.	  Remarks	  of	  Commissioner	  
Joshua	  D.	  Wright,	  Section	  5	  Recast:	  Defining	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission’s	  Unfair	  Methods	  of	  Competition	  
Authority	  (June	  19,	  2013)	  (hereinafter,	  Wright	  Speech);	  Remarks	  of	  Commissioner	  Maureen	  K.	  Ohlhausen,	  Section	  
5:	  Principles	  of	  Navigation	  (July	  25,	  2013)	  (hereinafter,	  Ohlhausen	  Speech),	  available	  at	  
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ohlhausen/130725section5speech.pdf.	  
3	  For	  criticisms	  of	  the	  use	  of	  Section	  5,	  see	  William	  E.	  Kovacic	  &	  Mark	  Winerman,	  Competition	  Policy	  and	  the	  
Application	  of	  Section	  5	  of	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  Act,	  76	  ANTITRUST	  L.J.	  929	  (2010).	  
 2	  
of	  the	  FTC	  to	  supplement	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  and	  Clayton	  Act,	  these	  gaps	  can	  be	  addressed	  with	  a	  Section	  
5	  standard.4	  	  
For	  example,	  neither	  Section	  1	  nor	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  reaches	  unilateral	  conduct	  that	  
allows	  a	  firm	  or	  group	  of	  firms	  to	  achieve,	  maintain,	  or	  enhance	  market	  power,	  and	  facilitate	  its	  exercise.	  
The	   market	   power	   might	   be	   exercised	   directly	   by	   a	   single	   firm	   or	   it	   might	   involve	   parallel	  
accommodating	   conduct	   or	   other	   forms	   of	   tacit	   coordination	   that	   do	   not	   by	   themselves	   satisfy	   the	  
Section	   1	   agreement	   requirement.	   As	   result,	   such	   conduct	   can	   lead	   to	   consumer	   harm	   of	   the	   type	  
encompassed	   by	   the	   antitrust	   laws,	   yet	   not	   be	   prohibited	   or	   deterred	   by	   the	   Sherman	   Act.	   Applying	  
Section	  5	  to	  conduct	  that	  causes	  harm	  to	  competition	  in	  this	  way	  can	  help	  to	  fill	  this	  gap.5	  
The	   need	   for	   this	   gap-­‐filling	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	   insights	   of	   modern	   industrial	   organization	  
economics:	  	  
• Most	   importantly,	   modern	   competitive	   effects	   analysis	   focuses	   on	   the	   likelihood	   and	  
magnitude	  of	   the	   alleged	  price	   and	  output	   effects	   that	   are	   caused	  by	   the	   conduct,	   rather	  
than	   the	   pre-­‐existing	   degree	   of	   market	   power	   (or	   monopoly	   power).6	  In	   fact,	   one	   can	  
characterize	  both	  market	  power	  and	  monopoly	  power	  as	   the	  power	   to	  engage	   in	  conduct	  
that	  leads	  to	  higher	  prices.7	  Pre-­‐existing	  power	  is	  only	  an	  imperfect	  proxy	  for	  the	  likelihood	  
of	  harmful	  effects	  from	  allegedly	  anticompetitive	  conduct.	  Nor	  does	  the	  existence	  of	  market	  
or	  monopoly	  power	  compel	  a	  finding	  of	  anticompetitive	  effects.	  	  
• Market	   power	   and	   monopoly	   power	   are	   essentially	   synonyms	   in	   economics,	   rather	   than	  
having	  a	  bright	  line	  between	  them.8	  	  
• Market	   share	  often	   is	   a	   poor	   proxy	   for	   a	   firm’s	   degree	  of	  monopoly	   or	  market	   power,	   so	  
requiring	  a	  showing	  of	  a	  very	  high	  market	  share	  to	  find	  monopoly	  power	  leads	  to	  error.	  	  
• In	  a	  market	  in	  which	  firms	  interact	  repeatedly	  over	  time,	  market	  outcomes	  may	  not	  depend	  
closely	  on	  where	   the	  conduct	   lies	  on	   the	  continuum	  between	  explicit	   collusion	  and	  purely	  
parallel	  conduct.	  	  
                                                      
4	  	  For	  the	  view	  that	  Section	  5	  standards	  should	  be	  the	  same	  as	  the	  Sherman	  Act,	  see	  A.	  Douglas	  Melamed,	  
Comments:	  Workshop	  Concerning	  Section	  5	  of	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  Act	  (October	  14,	  2008),	  available	  at	  
http://ftc.gov/os/comments/section5workshop/537633-­‐00004.pdf,	  
5	  Herbert	  J.	  Hovenkamp,	  The	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  and	  the	  Sherman	  Act,	  62	  FLORIDA	  L.R.	  871	  (2010)	  also	  
suggests	  applying	  Section	  5	  in	  this	  way.	  Professor	  Hovenkamp	  also	  considers	  applying	  Section	  5	  to	  conduct	  
analogous	  to	  “abuse	  of	  dominance.”	  My	  comments	  here	  do	  not	  address	  the	  application	  of	  an	  abuse	  of	  dominance	  
standard,	  which	  involves	  some	  further	  analysis.	  	  	  
6	  Thomas	  G.	  Krattenmaker	  &	  Steven	  C.	  Salop,	  Anticompetitive	  Exclusion:	  Raising	  Rivals'	  Costs	  to	  Achieve	  
Power	  Over	  Price,	  96	  YALE	  L.J.	  209	  (1986).	  
7	  Steven	  C.	  Salop,	  The	  First	  Principles	  Approach	  to	  Antitrust,	  Kodak,	  and	  Antitrust	  at	  the	  Millenium,	  68	  
ANTITRUST	  L.J.	  187	  (2000).	  For	  example,	  opportunistically	  breaking	  a	  promise	  to	  an	  SSO	  that	  royalties	  will	  be	  FRAND	  
(or	  deceiving	  the	  SSO	  or	  potential	  licensees	  that	  such	  a	  promise	  has	  been	  made)	  is	  conduct	  that	  can	  permit	  a	  
patent	  holder	  to	  achieve	  market	  power	  after	  the	  licensees	  are	  locked-­‐in	  and	  permit	  it	  to	  raise	  its	  royalty,	  thereby	  
harming	  consumers	  as	  the	  royalty	  is	  passed	  on.	  	  
8	  It	  makes	  more	  economic	  sense	  for	  courts	  to	  treat	  monopoly	  power	  simply	  as	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  market	  
power.	  For	  example,	  see	  Thomas	  G.	  Krattenmaker,	  Robert	  H.	  Lande,	  &	  Steven	  C.	  Salop,	  Monopoly	  Power	  and	  
Market	  Power	  in	  Antitrust	  Law,	  76	  GEORGETOWN	  L.J.	  241	  (1987).	  	  	  
 3	  
However,	  courts	  often	  do	  not	  take	  these	  insights	  to	  heart.	  They	  erroneously	  act	  as	  if	  that	  there	  
is	  an	  economic	  bright	  line	  between	  “market	  power”	  and	  “monopoly	  power,”	  they	  sometimes	  make	  pre-­‐
existing	  monopoly	  power	  a	  preliminary	  screen,	  and	  they	  generally	  require	  a	  very	  high	  market	  share	  for	  a	  
finding	  of	  monopoly	  power.9	  They	  also	  erroneously	  act	  as	   if	   there	   is	  an	  economic	  bright	   line	  between	  
“agreements”	  and	  “conscious	  parallelism,”	  and	  they	  have	  set	  a	  high	  bar	  for	  finding	  an	  agreement.	  	  
As	  a	  result,	  neither	  Section	  1	  nor	  Section	  2	  is	  sufficient	  to	  prohibit	  or	  deter	  a	  range	  of	  conduct	  
that	  leads	  to	  consumer	  harm	  from	  the	  achievement	  and	  exercise	  of	  market	  power.	  A	  “screen”	  that	  relies	  
on	  a	  showing	  of	  “monopoly	  power”	  or	   the	  existence	  of	  an	  “agreement”	  may	  eliminate	   false	  positives,	  
but	  only	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  false	  negatives	  and	  under-­‐deterrence.	  
Conduct	  that	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  achievement,	  enhancement,	  or	  maintenance	  of	  market	  power	  can	  
include	  unilateral	  adoption	  of	  exclusive	  dealing,	   conditional	  price	  discounts	   (i.e.,	   loyalty	  discounts	  and	  
bundled	  discounts),	  most-­‐favored	  nations	  terms,	  vertical	  restraints,	  breach	  of	  contract,	  and	  deception.	  
Where	  this	  conduct	  involves	  vertical	  contracts	  (or	  other	  agreements)	  with	  suppliers	  or	  customers,	  it	  can	  
be	  reached	  under	  Section	  1.	  However,	  where	  the	  conduct	  is	  found	  to	  be	  unilateral,	  a	  gap	  may	  result.	  The	  
unreached	   conduct	   also	   can	   include	   invitations	   to	   collude	   that	   are	   not	   uniquely	   or	   sufficiently	  
“unequivocal”	  or	  “consequential”	  to	  violate	  Section	  2.10	  
Section	  5	  is	  well-­‐situated	  to	  fulfill	  the	  role	  of	  reaching	  this	  type	  of	  conduct	  as	  part	  of	  a	  rationally	  
designed	  antitrust	  enforcement	  system.	  In	  principle,	  these	  competitive	  concerns	  could	  be	  incorporated	  
into	   the	   Sherman	   Act.	   But,	   courts	   might	   be	   concerned	   that	   doing	   so	   would	   lead	   to	   over-­‐deterrence	  
because	  of	  the	  treble	  damages	  remedy	  that	  applies	  to	  most	  Sherman	  Act	  allegations.11	  This	  same	  treble	  
damages	  sanction	  also	  applies	  whether	  the	  defendant	  violates	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  by	  a	  little	  or	  by	  a	  lot.12	  
In	   contrast,	   a	   violation	   of	   Section	   5	   is	   not	   subject	   to	   treble	   damages.	   This	   weaker	   sanction	   may	   be	  
appropriate	   for	  conduct	   that	  generally	  would	  be	  presumed	  to	  have	  somewhat	   less	  harmful	  effects	  on	  
consumers,	  where	  it	  might	  be	  feared	  that	  treble	  damages	  would	  lead	  to	  over-­‐deterrence.13	  
III.	  AN	  APPROPRIATE	  GAP-­‐FILLING	  STANDARD	  FOR	  SECTION	  5	  
This	  analysis	  suggests	  a	  Section	  5	  standard	  that	  shares	  some	  similarities	  with	  the	  approaches	  of	  
Commissioners	   Wright	   and	   Ohlhausen,	   but	   with	   some	   other	   significant	   differences.	   Our	   major	  
agreement	  is	  that	  the	  basic	  standard	  should	  be	  geared	  to	  the	  condemnation	  of	  unilateral	  conduct	  that	  
                                                      
9	  They	  also	  sometimes	  fall	  victim	  to	  the	  “Cellophane	  Fallacy”	  and	  fail	  to	  recognize	  the	  existence	  of	  monopoly	  
power.	  	  
10	  United	  States	  v.	  American	  Airlines,	  Inc.,	  743	  F.2d	  1114,	  1119	  (5th	  Cir.	  1984).	  
11	  For	  example,	  see	  Copperweld	  Corp.	  v.	  Independence	  Tube	  Corp.	  467	  U.S.	  752	  (1984)	  
12	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  there	  is	  never	  any	  tailoring	  of	  sanctions.	  Price-­‐fixing	  is	  subject	  to	  criminal	  penalties,	  
damages	  can	  differ	  according	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  conduct	  undertaken,	  and	  there	  can	  be	  punitive	  damages.	  In	  Section	  
2,	  more	  egregious	  exclusionary	  conduct	  might	  lead	  to	  a	  break-­‐up	  remedy	  instead	  of	  conduct	  relief.	  Section	  5	  
complaints	  sometimes	  lead	  to	  follow-­‐on	  private	  actions	  under	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  or	  state	  laws	  that	  lead	  to	  exposure	  
for	  treble	  damages.	  However,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  violations	  of	  Section	  5	  involve	  lower	  expected	  sanctions.	  And,	  even	  in	  
follow-­‐on	  cases,	  the	  plaintiffs	  would	  not	  benefit	  from	  collateral	  estoppel	  in	  most	  cases.	  	  
13	  	  For	  example,	  traffic	  laws	  are	  tailored	  to	  the	  continuum	  of	  conduct	  concerns	  and	  likely	  effects.	  There	  is	  a	  
higher	  sanction	  for	  more	  excessive	  speed,	  speeding	  in	  construction	  zones,	  or	  where	  the	  driver	  is	  impaired	  from	  
alcohol	  or	  drugs.	  The	  permissible	  speed	  limit	  depends	  on	  the	  type	  of	  road	  and	  other	  conditions.	  
 4	  
allows	  a	   firm	  or	   firms	  to	  achieve,	  maintain,	  or	  enhance	  market	  power	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  consumers,	  
even	  if	  it	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  monopoly.14	  	  
Where	   we	   differ	   is	   the	   weight	   given	   to	   cognizable	   efficiencies.	   For	   example,	   Commissioner	  
Wright	   proposes	   a	   two-­‐pronged	   standard.	   His	   first	   prong	   requires	   a	   showing	   that	   the	   conduct	  would	  
cause	  harm	  to	  consumers.	  Commissioner	  Wright	  refers	  to	  this	  as	  a	  “harm	  to	  competition”	  standard.	  His	  
second	   prong	   requires	   a	   showing	   that	   there	   are	   “no	   cognizable	   efficiency	   benefits”	   flowing	   from	   the	  
conduct.	  Both	  prongs	  must	  be	  satisfied	  for	  a	  violation	  of	  Section	  5.15	  	  
Commissioner	   Ohlhausen	   adopts	   a	   similar	   first	   prong.	   However,	   she	   suggests	   a	   somewhat	  
weaker	  second	  prong,	  that	  the	  “gross”	  consumer	  harms	  (i.e.,	  ignoring	  efficiency	  consumer	  benefits)	  are	  
“disproportionate”	  to	  the	  cognizable	  efficiency	  benefits,	  so	  that	  the	  “net”	  consumer	  harms	  are	  large.16	  
Commissioner	  Ohlhausen’s	  proposed	  Guidelines	  also	  include	  a	  number	  of	  other	  conditions	  that	  must	  be	  
satisfied.17	  
In	  contrast,	  I	  suggest	  a	  Section	  5	  standard	  analogous	  to	  the	  Section	  1	  rule	  of	  reason,	  but	  applied	  
to	   unilateral	   conduct.	   Unilateral	   conduct	   would	   violate	   Section	   5	   if	   it	   leads	   to	   the	   achievement,	  
maintenance,	  or	  enhancement	  of	  market	  power	  that	  likely	  harms	  consumers	  on	  balance,	  even	  after	  the	  
consumer	  benefits	  from	  cognizable	  efficiencies	  of	  the	  conduct	  are	  taken	  into	  account.	  Thus,	  in	  order	  to	  
justify	   the	   conduct,	   the	   cognizable	  efficiencies	  must	  be	   sufficiently	   large	  and	   sufficiently	  passed	  on	   to	  
consumers	  to	  prevent	  that	  consumer	  harm.18	  	  
It	  is	  clear	  that	  this	  rule	  of	  reason	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  unilateral	  conduct	  as	  well	  as	  agreements.	  For	  
example,	  the	  DC	  Circuit	  applied	  the	  basic	  Section	  1	  rule	  of	  reason	  to	  Section	  2	  in	  Microsoft	  and	  explained	  
the	  benefits	  of	  doing	  so.19	  My	  suggested	  standard	   is	   similar,	  but	  applied	   to	   the	  harms	   from	  achieving,	  
maintaining,	  or	  enhancing	  market	  power	  instead	  of	  monopoly	  power.20	  
Thus,	   we	   all	   three	   have	   the	   same	   overarching	   goal	   of	   condemning	   conduct	   that	   harms	  
consumers.21	  However,	  I	  disagree	  with	  the	  Commissioners’	  approaches	  to	  the	  second	  prong,	  which	  over-­‐
                                                      
14	  Wright	  Statement	  at	  8,	  supra	  note	  2.	  Ohlhausen	  Speech	  at	  7,	  supra	  note	  2.	  As	  noted	  earlier,	  Section	  5	  also	  
might	  be	  applied	  to	  conduct	  analogous	  to	  “abuse	  of	  dominance.	  See	  Hovenkamp,	  supra	  note	  5.	  While	  I	  do	  not	  
analyze	  Professor	  Hovenkamp’s	  proposal	  here,	  I	  elsewhere	  have	  analyzed	  refusals	  to	  deal	  under	  the	  Sherman	  Act,	  
and	  that	  analysis	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  Section	  5	  as	  well.	  Steven	  C.	  Salop,	  Refusals	  to	  Deal	  and	  Price	  Squeezes	  by	  an	  
Unregulated,	  Vertically	  Integrated	  Monopolist,	  76	  ANTITRUST	  L.J.	  709	  (2010).	  	  
15	  Wright	  Statement	  at	  9,	  supra	  note	  2.	  	  
16	  Ohlhausen	  Speech	  at	  7-­‐8,	  10,	  supra	  note	  2.	  By	  “gross”	  harm	  to	  consumers,	  I	  mean	  the	  consumer	  harm	  that	  
would	  occur	  if	  there	  were	  no	  consumer	  benefits	  from	  cognizable	  efficiencies.	  By	  “net”	  consumer	  harm,	  I	  mean	  the	  
consumer	  harm	  suffered	  after	  the	  cognizable	  benefits	  passed	  on	  to	  consumers	  are	  taken	  into	  account.	  	  
17	  Ohlhausen	  Speech	  at	  11-­‐13,	  supra	  note	  2.	  
18	  This	  is	  a	  “net”	  consumer	  harm	  standard.	  This	  approach	  is	  appropriate	  because	  the	  goal	  of	  antitrust	  laws	  is	  
consumer	  welfare,	  not	  efficiency.	  	  
19	  	  United	  States	  v.	  Microsoft	  Corporation	  253	  F.3d	  34,	  58-­‐59	  (2001).	  
20	  	  My	  suggested	  approach	  would	  not	  require	  the	  Commission	  to	  make	  a	  mutually	  exclusive	  choice	  between	  
pleading	  its	  complaint	  in	  terms	  of	  market	  power	  versus	  monopoly	  power,	  or	  between	  unilateral	  versus	  concerted	  
conduct.	  The	  Section	  5	  standard	  would	  be	  like	  a	  lesser	  offense	  than	  the	  usual	  Sherman	  Act	  standard.	  	  
21	  	  Note	  also	  that	  showing	  merely	  harm	  to	  competitors	  (and	  not	  consumer	  harm)	  is	  insufficient	  by	  itself	  to	  
find	  a	  violation	  in	  all	  our	  approaches.	  Wright	  Statement	  at	  5,	  supra	  note	  2;	  Ohlhausen	  Speech	  at	  7,	  supra	  note	  2.	  In	  
 
 5	  
weight	   efficiencies	   and	   therefore	   can	   lead	   to	   outcomes	   that	   end	   up	   harming	   consumers.	   Our	  
disagreements	  over	  this	  second	  prong	  are	  not	  new	  to	  antitrust	  policy	  debates.	  The	  very	  same	  standards	  
and	  arguments	  have	  been	  raised	  with	  respect	  to	  Section	  2	  enforcement.22	  	  
The	   problems	   raised	   by	   the	   Commissioners’	   approaches	   are	  well	   illustrated	   by	   Commissioner	  
Wright’s	  proposal	  that	  conduct	  be	  immunized	  from	  attack	  under	  Section	  5’s	  UMC	  standard	  if	  it	  involves	  
any	   cognizable	   efficiency	   benefits.	   Commissioner	   Wright	   has	   proposed	   his	   efficiency	   safe	   harbor	   to	  
provide	   business	   certainty	   and	   prevent	   false	   positives,	   arbitrary	   enforcement,	   and	   over-­‐deterrence.23	  
However,	   the	   safe	   harbor	   is	   not	   necessary	   to	   achieve	   these	   effects.	   The	   analysis	   of	   consumer	   harm	  
under	   the	   rule	   of	   reason	   already	   entails	   analysis	   of	   cognizable	   efficiencies.	   The	   rule	   of	   reason	   also	  
balances	  business	  certainty	  with	  concerns	  about	  false	  negatives	  and	  over-­‐deterrence.24	  	  
Commissioner	   Wright	   apparently	   is	   most	   concerned	   with	   over-­‐deterrence	   from	   the	   FTC’s	  
administrative	  process,	  where	  the	  FTC	  acts	  as	  prosecutor	  and	  judge	  and	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  constraints	  
from	  an	  independent	  court	  deciding	  motions	  to	  dismiss	  and	  summary	  judgment.25	  However,	  there	  also	  
are	   forces	   tipping	   in	   the	   other	   direction.	   First,	   the	   FTC	   is	   an	   expert	   body	   with	   significant	   economics	  
resources	   available,	   resources	   that	   presumably	   can	   be	   used	   to	   avoid	   false	   negatives	   and	   over-­‐
deterrence.26	  Second,	   the	   Commission’s	   bipartisan	   nature	   and	   the	   use	   of	   majority	   rule	   also	   have	  
provided	  significant	  constraints	  over	  most	  of	   its	  history.	  Finally,	   if	  this	   is	  the	  main	  concern,	  his	  remedy	  
proposal	  instead	  might	  be	  that	  the	  FTC	  be	  forced	  to	  all	  litigate	  its	  complaints	  in	  District	  Court.27	  
My	  concern	  is	  that	  an	  efficiency	  safe	  harbor	  would	  neutralize	  virtually	  the	  entire	  gap-­‐filling	  role	  
of	   Section	   5	   enforcement.	   It	   often	   is	   simple	   for	   counsel	   or	   their	   economists	   to	   formulate	   “plausible”	  
efficiency	   justifications	   to	   deter	   a	   complaint.	   Even	   a	   trivial	   efficiency	   benefit	   would	   satisfy	   the	   safe	  
harbor	   standard.	   For	   example,	   extending	   Commissioner	   Wright’s	   Example	   7,	   suppose	   that	   product	  
incompatibility	  raises	  significant	  barriers	  to	  entry	  that	  would	  allow	  a	  firm	  to	  raise	  prices	  by	  $50,	  but	  not	  
achieve	  a	  monopoly.28	  Suppose	  that	  the	  incompatible	  product	  technology	  would	  lead	  to	  lower	  costs	  or	  
better	   performance	   that	   are	   worth	   only	   (say)	   50	   cents	   to	   consumers,	   ceteris	   paribus.	   Under	   the	  
efficiency	   safe	  harbor,	   that	   conduct	  would	  be	   immunized	   from	  Section	  5	  despite	   significant	  consumer	  
harms.29	  	  
                                                                                                                                                                              
this	  regard,	  a	  consumer	  welfare	  standard—but	  not	  a	  total	  welfare	  standard—ensures	  that	  harm	  to	  competitors	  is	  
not	  sufficient	  to	  find	  a	  violation.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  harm	  to	  competitors	  is	  given	  the	  same	  weight	  as	  consumer	  
benefits	  in	  the	  calculation	  of	  total	  welfare.	  
22	  	  For	  my	  own	  survey	  and	  conclusions,	  see	  Steven	  C.	  Salop,	  Exclusionary	  Conduct,	  Effect	  on	  Consumers,	  and	  
the	  Flawed	  Profit-­‐Sacrifice	  Standard,	  73	  ANTITRUST	  L.J.	  311	  (2006).	  
23	  Wright	  Statement	  at	  9,	  supra	  note	  2.	  
24	  For	  example,	  business	  certainty	  also	  is	  increased	  by	  a	  rule	  of	  per	  se	  illegality,	  as	  it	  would	  by	  a	  rule	  of	  per	  se	  
legality.	  But,	  neither	  of	  these	  extreme	  standards	  generally	  provides	  the	  right	  balance.	  
25	  Wright	  Speech	  at	  10,	  supra	  note	  2.	  See	  also	  Melamed,	  supra	  note	  4.	  	  
26	  Wright	  Statement	  at	  4-­‐5,	  supra	  note	  2.	  
27	  In	  fact,	  Commissioner	  Wright	  may	  be	  leaning	  in	  this	  direction.	  Wright	  Speech	  at	  17,26,	  supra	  note	  2.	  
28	  Wright	  Statement	  at	  14,	  supra	  note	  2.	  
29	  For	  example,	  Stone	  Container’s	  communications	  regarding	  exchange	  agreements	  with	  rivals	  plausibly	  could	  
have	  reduced	  costs,	  even	  as	  it	  facilitated	  price	  increases	  and	  reduced	  output.	  In	  the	  Matter	  of	  Stone	  Container	  
(February	  25,	  1998),	  available	  at	  http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/02/9510006.cmp.htm.	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Commissioner	  Ohlhausen	  suggests	  either	  the	  efficiency	  safe	  harbor	  or	  a	  required	  showing	  that	  
the	  harm	  to	  competition	  is	  “disproportionate	  to	  its	  benefits.”30	  While	  a	  disproportionate	  harm	  standard	  
is	   superior	   to	   the	  safe	  harbor	   for	  preventing	  over-­‐deterrence	  and	   false	  positives,	   it	   raises	   similar	   false	  
negatives	  and	  under-­‐deterrence	  concerns.	  It	  places	  an	  unnecessary	  “thumb	  on	  the	  scale,”	  particularly	  in	  
light	   of	   the	   weak	   sanction	   and	   the	   constraints	   that	   flow	   generally	   from	   the	   Commission	   being	   a	  
bipartisan	  group	  with	  majority	  voting	  and	  an	  expert	  economic	  staff.	  	  
The	  disproportionate	  harm	  standard	  also	  would	  not	  provide	  transparency	  or	  eliminate	  business	  
uncertainty.	   Commissioners	   likely	   would	   differ	   in	   their	   determination,	   perhaps	   substantially,	   on	   how	  
heavy	  a	   thumb	   to	  place	   to	   the	   scale,	   so	   it	  would	  be	  necessary	   to	  predict	   the	   thumb	  of	   the	   “median”	  
Commissioner	  for	  the	  case.	  This	  diversity	  of	  types	  of	  conduct	  also	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  the	  appropriate	  
weight	  of	  the	  thumb	  for	  each	  of	  the	  different	  types	  of	  conduct.	  This	  subjectivity	  can	  lead	  to	  uncertainty	  
and	  under-­‐deterrence.31	  
Her	  proposal	  also	  adds	  several	  other	  restrictions,	  such	  as	  determining	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  conflict	  
with	  another	  federal	  agency,	  whether	  another	  agency	  would	  be	  a	  more	  effective	  enforcer,	  or	  whether	  a	  
non-­‐enforcement	   remedy	   might	   be	   sufficient.32	  These	   additional	   conditions	   seem	   unnecessary	   and	  
potentially	  counterproductive.	  It	  is	  not	  unusual	  for	  conduct	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  rules	  of	  several	  agencies	  
with	  somewhat	  different	  statutes.	  For	  example,	  the	  DOJ	  and	  FCC	  both	  review	  telecom	  mergers,	  the	  DOJ	  
under	   the	   Clayton	   Act	   antitrust	   standard	   and	   the	   FCC	   under	   the	   Communications	   Act	   public	   interest	  
standard.	   Avoiding	   conflict	   with	   other	   agencies	   also	   runs	   the	   risk	   of	   interfering	   with	   the	   FTC’s	   well-­‐
regarded	  state	  action	  programs.	  Non-­‐binding	  voluntary	  action	  by	  the	  respondent	  always	  can	  substitute	  
for	  law	  enforcement,	  but	  would	  provide	  significantly	  less	  deterrence.33	  
III.	  CONCLUSION	  
For	  these	  reasons,	  antitrust	  enforcement	  and	  deterrence	  would	  be	  better	  served	  by	  a	  Section	  5	  
UMC	  rule	  of	  reason	  standard	  that	  evaluates	  whether	  there	  is	  likely	  consumer	  harm	  from	  market	  power,	  
even	  after	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  consumer	  benefits	  from	  cognizable	  efficiencies	  passed	  on	  consumers.	  
This	   rule	   of	   reason	   standard	   is	   sufficient.	   There	   is	   no	   need—and	   there	   are	   serious	   risks	   of	   under-­‐
deterrence—from	  a	  Section	  5	   legal	   standard	  or	  enforcement	  guidelines	   that	  also	   include	  an	  efficiency	  
safe	  harbor,	  a	  disproportionate	  harm	  standard,	  or	  other	  additional	  restrictions.	  However,	  whether	  the	  
Commission	  can	  reach	  consensus	  on	  this	  or	  another	  standard	  remains	  the	  big	  open	  question. 
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